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The great transition: The dynamics of market transitions
and the case of Russia, 1991^1995
JEFFREY K. HASS
Washington and Lee University

[T]he precipitous inauguration of a new economic
system will certainly entail signi¢cant costs....
Chief among these would be the necessary process
of learning how to organize and function in a new
system of production. But we know ... that the
development of the skills, attitudes, and values
consistent with a novel economic system is not a
matter of years, but of decades and even generations.1

Multidimensionality and economic change
The market transition in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union
brings us back to essential issues that Marx and Weber addressed: the
genesis of capitalism and the process of economic change.2 What is the
transition and what does it involve ^ restructuring incentives, creating
new laws, learning new culture, or creating new power structures? The
answer partially depends on the particular transition (initial conditions, targets, actors' perceptions); but necessary general frameworks
remain elusive, and current economic policies and analyses reveal that
we understand little more about economic change than a century ago.
Recent works on market transitions have furthered our understanding,
but also tend to focus on narrow issues: the ``success'' or ``failure'' of
transitions, elite circulation, ¢nancial institutions, networks, and privatization and property changes.3 These timely and useful contributions still do not orient us to a broader dynamic ^ that is, just what the
transition is is left out.4 Is it path dependent policies? Reorganization
of ¢nancial systems or property control? The rise or collapse of political alliances and a power elite? 5 It is these and more, together in one
complex. If we are to understand the process of constructing capitalism, I suggest we look beyond policies and ¢nance to the process of
Theory and Society 28: 383^424, 1999.
ß 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
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how actors try to understand their worlds, create meaning, and enforce
this meaning.
Three crucial aspects need to be brought into focus. The ¢rst is a sense
of dynamic. As Schumpeter and historians have noted, capitalism is a
process (``creative destruction'') overthrowing previous economic
practices and institutions;6 given the pace and extremity of change,
contemporary transitions should be no less destructive and confusing.
New economies do not arise mechanically from initial conditions or
macro-level incentives7 but instead involve the interaction of smaller
tactics and strategies as much as laws and elite actions ^ a complex of
destruction and reformation with numerous twists and turns and unexpected outcomes shaping economic change and capitalism-building.8
The second aspect is the role of power and culture.9 The transition is
often analyzed in terms of static factors (in£ation and money supply,
exchange rates) or structures (relations of ownership),10 and actors are
assumed to respond automatically to exogenous incentives. But this is
too simplistic; people are not automatons reacting viscerally to exogenous stimuli, but instead actively interpret and construct their worlds.
Thus, economic change has two deeper sources.11 The ¢rst is culture ^
tool kits of strategies, understandings, and assumptions. The transition
may be (a la Douglass North) a change in ``mental states'' (culture) as
well as laws; actors' subjective conceptions and understandings might
not automatically shift to new economic rules.12 However, culture
cannot lead directly to change unless understandings, models, categories, and practices are rei¢ed and imposed on the larger social body;
power must enter the picture.13 To understand market transitions, we
must follow how categories and models change and are imposed.14 I
suggest that economy-building is culture-building (changes in models)
and authority-building (enforcing these models) ^ a power-culture link
of de¢nition, rei¢cation, and selection.15 Put simply, principles of activity
are used to judge behavior; nonconformism is punished (market exit),
and conformists reproduce ``correct'' practices.16
This leads to a third crucial point: economic change is not uniform
across the economic board but instead is multidimensional. The degree
and speed of the shift in principles and practices will depend on the
organization of authority amd enforcement and on changes in rules.
But both cultural models and bases for authority and power may be
changing simultaneously. Further, the link between power and culture
and the process of change in principles need not look the same in
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di¡erent arenas of activity (production, exchange, ¢nance): depending
on the change in enforcement mechanisms and on the delegitimation
of original ground rules (and the distance between old and new rules),
the speed, direction, and overall process of readjustment and change
may di¡er across arenas and sets of rules. Change in ¢nancial rules
may be more rapid (and successful) than changes in production rules;
changes in ¢nancial rules may be more rapid (and successful) for banks
than for industrial ¢rms. The idea of multidimensionality is simple: we
must focus on change in and operation of enforcement mechanisms
and on the mesh of old and new cultural constructs to be enforced.
In this article I use the Russian case17 to make sense of this contemporary ``Great Transformation'' by examining how cultural constructs
become ground rules and fundamental principles structuring economic
life. I use data from interviews of directors and entrepreneurs (1994^
1995, 1997), observation of small ¢rms (1994^1996), enterprise newspapers (1988^1995), and business media; all but the last were from
St. Petersburg. I hope to reorient analysis from e¤ciency, incentives,
and risk (important but not all) to power, culture, and process and to
draw attention to the di¤culty of switching between economic logics
(sets of taken-for-granted principles and categories).18 I also want to
show the importance of multidimensional change: that market-building is not smooth and uniform across arenas and sectors (¢nance, sales,
production), and that change will lead to confusion and con£ict within
and between arenas, making the transition not as straightforward as
imagined earlier.
Economic change and transitions
David Stark noted that the initial stages of transition would be marked
by heterogeneity of forms, practices, and strategies, and this would
provide the basis for innovation.19 Stark's insight is valid but misses
the £ip side of heterogeneity: confusion and con£ict. It is one thing to
have multiple organizational forms; it is another when there also are
multiple economic rules of economic action and multiple strategies
and understandings driving decisions. Stark appears to assume that
actors already have certain ground rules and basic frameworks in
which heterogeneity drives innovation, or that the lack of these ground
rules is not important.20 We should avoid this assumption; transition
can mean changes in ground rules of economic activity, making heterogeneity a curse as well as a blessing.

386
These ground rules or economic principles are similar to what Fligstein called ``conceptions of control,'' 21 except that they structure more
than organizational ¢elds but also the strategies, tactics, and logics
used to address perceived incentives. Economic principles and ground
rules include the organization of ¢rms, and the rules of exchange, debt
payment, ¢nancial operations, and interpreting demand and production. That economies involve not just organizations and incentive
structures but also ground rules embedded in institutional procedures
and shared cognitive frameworks and understandings has been demonstrated by scholars of economic change and history.22 Thus, we expect
that a radical transition (such as in Russia) involves not simply liberalization of prices and privatization, but also radically transforming or
creating fundamental economic principles and criteria for interpreting, evaluating, and structuring behavior, process, and results. Such
principles provide orientations to strategy and practice, and criteria
provide a way for actors to evaluate whether action is correct and
whether it will result in sanctions or support. For example, in the
Soviet economy, evaluation criteria were a combination of overall
gross output (regardless of use), new technologies,23 and maintaining
an enterprise-centered paternalist system of social care. Debt payment
and e¤cient production were less important than maintaining overemployment (a way to get increased funding), deriving new technologies (rewarding R&D for the sake of R&D), and producing for the
sake of producing once an order was put in (in order to ful¢ll the Plan).
What are the measuring rods of the developing capitalism system?
This was and is not so clear in Russia. Are they enterprise paternalism
and support, as many directors (young and old, of large and small
¢rms) continue to believe? Are they maintaining production regardless
of debt or producing e¤ciently for the sake of pro¢t margins?
Yet culture is only part of the story, for new principles and criteria are
meaningless unless they spread and are adopted. This may happen
through isomorphic mechanisms,24 such as generational shifts as new
experts with new models and sets of strategies rise through the ranks.25
However, this process takes many years; over a prolonged period
the risk of ``backsliding'' or returning to previous forms increases.26
Second, isomorphism works best when there is already a stable foundation on which new conceptions can be built. Transitions, on the
other hand, involve a rupture of previous shared expectations. In a
situation of heterogeneity, younger experts may receive both homogeneous formal training and heterogeneous real experience and socialization at the workplace.
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Another method by which ground rules spread and eventually become
embedded in social processes is more direct enforcement. Some isomorphic mechanisms involve more direct enforcement, such as competitive isomorphism (competitive pressures to adapt or go under) or
coercive isomorphism (pressure from resource dependency). Power
comes into the picture: economic principles are imposed. The next
issue is mechanisms of imposition ^ what are these, how do they
operate (if at all), and are they themselves changing in the transition?
Shared expectations and social capital may help isomorphism in a
stable economy undergoing marginal changes; but what about when
those expectations are shattered or machanisms of authority are unstable? Debt payment may be important in monetized capitalism, but
if there is no mechanism enforcing debt payment (liens, bankruptcy) or
no actors able or willing to collect on debt, arrears might rise to
incredible levels (as they did in Russia).27 Thus, the transition is not
simply creating new principles and understandings but also creating
and activating mechanisms of imposition and rei¢cation, spreading
categories and understandings into natural and society-wide forms
through learning and force. This means creating a new form of discipline and mechanisms to support it. Unlike Soviet discipline (production-centered and involving ``storming'' 28), capitalist discipline involved
hard budget constraints (taking account of investment sources and
debt for strategy), categorizing labor as an input, and reducing activity
to a ¢scal bottom line.29
This portends one particular problem of the transition: not only are
economic principles changing, but the mechanisms of power and disciplining (selection mechanisms) are in £ux as well. We notice this if we
return to forms of isomorphism that can transmit new principles.
Competitive isomorphism involves market pressures, but this assumes
such structures as a stock market or power of experts who can recommend for or against a particular ¢rm that does not play by the accepted rules. Needless to say, the rise of a homogenous group with such
power has yet to be seen in Russia. Coercive isomorphism requires a
body with coherence, power, and the will to use it; yet the state has
been a problematic policeman in many cases, and the rising banking
empires do not yet have the resources to turn their own vision into a
new hegemony. Mimetic isomorphism requires social networks and a
formal media for transmitting new ideas. This Russia has; but mimetic
isomorphism is the weakest form. Normative isomorphism (transmission through cohort socialization) was addressed above. With the collapse of the Soviet state and state system, the rise of competing elites
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(Soviet-era ``Red Directors'' versus younger ``New Russians''), and a
general breakdown in norms, power mechanisms have also shifted,
making the spread of new principles more problematic.30
Thus, the power-culture link needs to be the focus of an analysis of
transitions and economic change. Principles and disciplining mechanisms do not usually go unnoticed, but they seldom receive the stress
deserved. Neoclassical economics (e.g., as by shock therapy artists
Lipton and Sachs),31 while helpful in illustrating individual rationality
and calculation in business, assumes that ground rules are everywhere
the same (economic utility maximization) and that the invisible hand
of the market (e¤cient allocation and exit) will automatically act as
the disciplining mechanism. When disciplining institutions are mentioned (e.g., bankruptcy), the problems of creating this mechanism are
relegated to issues of legislation and legislators.32 Political economy 33
and New Institutional Economics,34 expressed forthrightly by Peter
Murrell (amongst others), focus on how structures a¡ect the costs of
action.35 Macro-level relations and power bases are the key focus of
explanation. For example, Burawoy and Krotov, whose work falls in
this tradition, claim that the transition is the collapse of structure
between and within ¢rms, leading to ``mercantilism.'' 36 David Stark
has suggested that economic organization is a direct descendent of
privatization policies.37 Blasi et al. suggest that institution-building is
primarily about elite competition over the economic pie, played out in
state policy and informal maneuvering.38 Hendley et al. stress legislation, although how e¡ectively that legislation is enforced is not addressed.39 These schools point out the importance of state-society
relations, state policies, and power, but miss the source of institutional
change or assume that change is derivative of power con£icts and
incentives alone. Further, social friction remains only an expression of
con£ict between competing interests; the actual confusion inherent in
everyday economic life (that one sees in a cursory glance of sources)
is missing. A second problem is inattention to process ^ how the
transition actually occurs. What happens when ¢rms exist previous to
the new rules that govern them? 40
Sociology, in its economic but especially political sub¢elds, provides
some ¢rmer ground for addressing process, power, and culture. Economic sociology, in particular the neo-institutional school of organizational analysis, turns our attention away from e¤ciency and incentives
to perceptions, tool kits of strategies, and legitimacy.41 Unfortunately,
economic sociology remains incomplete: little work directly addresses
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economic change or capitalism-building,42 and mechanisms and process
of change tend either to be assumed or ¢nessed.43 Political sociology
makes up for this by addressing process and change through the interaction of culture and authority. For example, studies of politics demonstrate that political decisions and actions are shaped not only by
interests and calculation (as rational actor theory would suggest), but
also by repertoires of action, rhetoric, ideology, and cultural constructs.44 A logical extension is that if political decisions and action
are shaped by institutions, culture, and repertoires of action, why
should this not be true for economic action? 45 While institutions
shape costs of action through legitimate and legal procedure (NIE's
point), cultural constructs ^ from tool kits of strategies to categories
and assumptions ^ shape the perceptions of opportunity and available
reactions.46 We do not have at hand an in¢nite number of strategies.
Finally, political sociology suggests that it is one thing to propose and
legislate, but quite another to implement, as studies of political change
and revolution point out. Why should the same not be true for economics ^ should the transition involve not only legislating new structures (e.g., through privatization or liberalization) but also changes in
tool kits (and the confrontation between tool kits and institutional
bounds) and the process of creating new bases and mechanisms of
authority. This is raised by Douglas North, who separates institutions
(``rules'') and culture (``mental states'') and adds that the two come
into synch only if selection mechanisms (e.g., bankruptcy or other
exit) operate. (Unfortunately, North does not problematize the origins,
operation, and variance of power.)
Drawing on insights from existing schools and on the empirical narrative to which I shortly turn, I suggest that economic change and
transitions follow this general dynamic:
à

à

In the ¢rst moments of change old institutional frameworks weaken
or are disposed, providing windows of opportunity. Actors interpret
and respond to incentives (opportunity for freedom or increased
gain) through categories, understandings, and strategies from their
histories.
These reactions may be blocked, however. Negative results or
experience (such as rising debts and losses rather than gains from
production) or an outside force (such as an external power punishing particular behavior) may act as a shock, forcing a rethinking of
models. A central organization, or a larger number of actors with
less institutional power but power in numbers (such as the aggre-
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à

à

à

gate of consumers), may demand behavior according to di¡erent
principles.
Once previous practices and models have been delegitimated
(partially or completely), actors search for new models and understandings. These may come from a new interpretation of past experience or from outside sources, such as the state, experts (foreign or
domestic), the business media, or ideas from competitors or allies in
the same or other economic sectors. Actors copy.
But actors may not copy well. The degree of change depends on a)
the amount of force exerted and its e¡ectiveness, and b) the degree
of di¡erence between old and new ground rules. The greater the leap
in logic, the greater the di¤culty, and hence the greater amount of
force needed. For example, it is one thing for ¢rms to have marketing divisions; it is another to understand the principles of marketing
and to ¢t them into processes of sales and production. Such major
changes may require that actors who do not have the skills or
understandings must exit the market; in theory this exit is forced
through mechanisms like bankruptcy or the stock market (where
``unskilled'' actors lose investment or are marginalized). The degree
to which new models are adopted depends on enforcement, attention to problems of changing models, the qualitative di¡erence
between old and new practices (``¢t''), and the degree to which the
knowledge of new practices is tacit (the more tacit such knowledge
is, the more di¤cult such behavioral change will be and the greater
the possibility that change will be super¢cial and interrupted by
decoupling).47 This means that economic change is both the creation and resolution of new models of organization and action and
the creation of authority to make them work. Such a process is
di¤cult, given the distance between old and new models,48 the
variety of strategic models that may arise, and the competing interests in the period of social reconstruction. Confusion and con£ict
are the natural handmaidens to the process of socially reconstructing the economy.
Finally, the creation of new institutions, involving this whole process
above, hinges on the power-culture link of selection. This is where
neoclassical economics and sociology complement each other. Neoclassical theory assumes selection based on universal models and
criteria: unpro¢table or ine¤cient actors are punished (market
exit), while pro¢table, e¤cient actors are rewarded. As economic
and political sociology suggest, selection mechanisms should not be
assumed; in fact, their change and creation should be the very focus
of study. Friction (confusion and con£ict) become central to the
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story of sorting out and reifying models and performance criteria.
These criteria also require enforcement mechanisms for selection
(punishment and reward) that ¢t the logic of those selection criteria.
When selection mechanisms are working, they can reify models
and procedures into hegemonies. This creates expectations among
others that certain rules are fundamental; and if these new rules do
not lead to crises or are not vigorously opposed, they can become
taken-for-granted.
As I suggested earlier, these processes of imposition, selection, and
rei¢cation di¡er across economic arenas and ¢elds, injecting a sense
of multidimensionality into the transition process. The crucial di¡erences are the distance of change, the clarity of target ground rules and
principles, and the mechanisms of power to enforce them. If rules are
vague, the distance is large, or there is no operative coherent enforcement structure, change in ground rules will be di¤cult, contentious,
and confused; if new rules are clear or enforced by a coherent power
structure, the transition in that particular arena should be more
smooth (although not entirely free of confusion, con£ict, and politics).
To draw out the nature of process, the relation of culture and power,
and the sense of multidimensionality, I turn to three brief illustrations
of rule-building. First I look at principles of ¢nance, the most straightforward transition owing to the power of the Central Bank to formulate and impose new principles of ¢nancial activity. Then I turn to
principles of exchange and production, in particular interpretation of
and reaction to market demand; this illustrates how a more vague
enforcement mechanism ^ monetization and interaction between actors ^ can enforce, albeit slowly and imperfectly. Here the principles of
demand were adopted outwardly after initial shocks; but the problem
of decoupling made further adaptation di¤cult. Finally I turn to principles of organization and enterprise restructuring. Here we see that
what was initially the most straightforward shift in principles became
the most di¤cult, owing to competition among models, confusion over
all models, and the lack of a mechanism that could enforce. For these
three areas, a rough schema of power, culture, and change would look
like this:
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Area

Source of new
principles

Power ¢eld

Outcome

Finance

1. Central Bank
2. Isomorphism

1. Control over deposit
policy
2. Interactions with
foreigners, information

1. Slow, stronger
for small banks
2. Slow, unsteady

Production/
sales

1. Isomorphism and
media
2. Demand and
solvency (need for
money)

1. Unstructured
in£uence at best
2. Incoherent; problems
of interpretation, imposition through aggregated individual actions

1. Suggestions for
change, but no real
push
2. Slow change,
incomplete

Organization

Managers' and
workers' conceptions (from
experience, media)

Managers have formal
power, but in reality
con£ict ensues

Initial change takes
place, then stalls

Principles of ¢nance: The example of banking
In the banking sector the Central Bank emerged as a policeman able
(to an extent) to provide and enforce new principles and select for
banks accordingly. Further, the shift in principles ^ from banks as
speculators or deep pockets for ¢rms to strict guardians of economic
order ^ while di¤cult and muddled by politics, is not as large a shift
as in other ¢elds explored later. Hence, the banking ¢eld should (and
does) show the most relative success in shifting to new principles
and practices: cadres were often less socialized in Soviet mentalities,
the shift in principles was not enormous, and there was a central
organization with the will and power to enforce new principles, the
Central Bank.
The Central Bank's emergence in this capacity was not inevitable: its
early weakness (lack of autonomy) helped contribute to hyperin£ation
in 1992. However, the 1993 constitution (reinforced later by an April
1995 law) provided the Central Bank with increased autonomy ^ decisions were under less pressure and control from the legislature than
before.49 The Central Bank gained tools of power, such as re¢nancing
and oversight mechanisms (the right to audit or to revoke a bank's
license). Central Bank heads sta¡ed the organization with younger
trained experts (usually) capable of doing their jobs. Finally, after the
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ruble's shocking collapse in October 1994, Tatiana Paramonova took
over for Viktor Gerashchenko and proved herself a capable ¢nancial
technocrat. While the Bank had a reversal in fortune in 1998 (political
intrigues and economic breakdown brought Gerashchenko back),
there is reason to believe it will retain its position as ¢nancial policeman and enforcer.
Paramonova hoped to create new ¢nancial ground rules and force the
banks to follow them. Before 1995 banking practices had contributed
to ¢nancial instability. Loan practices were based less on evaluating
business plans than on trust or personal connections, leading to increasing numbers of bad loan portfolios. Bank branches were under
weak control from the center, often following dubious loan procedures.
One example of this problem should provide a good picture, especially
as this appears to have happened more than once with new Russian
banks. Dmitrii Gorshkov, ¢nancial director of a new ¢rm, went into
a famous bank and asked for hard cash for an agricultural purchase;
one bank worker obliged and handed over 15 million rubles. The
Department for the Struggle with Economic Crime discovered that
the money was earmarked to buy cars as barter for Ukrainian sugar;
however, the money never went to the earmarked person or ¢rm, and
instead went to an Israeli citizen who had left St. Petersburg.50 To
o¡set the drawbacks of these problematic practices, banks practiced
currency speculation, pro¢t from which o¡set bad loans and masked
other banking practices. The bottom line may have been pro¢t, but
actual practice encompassed other means as well.51
To Paramonova, banks' practices were making money but endangering
the economy; speculation was contributing to macroeconomic (currency) instability.52 Paramonova was determined to change banking
practice and principles through Central Bank power; banks that could
adapt to new principles would survive; and those that could not would
go, through bankruptcy, license revocation by the Central Bank, or
mergers.53 Her projects to bring Russia's banks into line included
introducing a ruble corridor, limiting credit emissions to banks, increasing required deposits with the Central Bank, increasing bank
audits, and revoking licenses for banks with dangerous balances or
questionable practices.54 The Central Bank sponsored seminars on
¢nancial and banking practice to foster new understandings and skills.
While this did not win over many allies ^ elite bankers pressured the
Duma to reject her permanent appointment three times ^ she did
begin the process of weeding out banks not playing by the new ground

394
rules. The ruble corridor and increased deposits deprived banks of the
ability to speculate on a large scale. Banks would have to be more
disciplined, making money through more conservative, risk-averse
policies and through loans and ownership operations.55 With their
security blanket gone, many banks experienced problems. In St. Petersburg, for example, the Northern Trade Bank, which had made loans
on the basis of personal ties rather than prospects for repayment of
principle and interest, could no longer balance its bad loans with
speculation, and went into a ¢nancial crisis in the fall of 1995. A
consortium of stronger Petersburg banks stepped in and began to do
what Northern Trade should have done: attempting to get back what
they could from bad loans.56
Other isomorphic mechanisms have been at work disciplining banks
into new behavior and principles besides the scrutiny of the Central
Bank. Working with foreign banks and foreign companies has forced
bank directors to realize the need for a professional sta¡ (``professional'' in the sense of training and behavior) and for more re¢ned
procedures, such as the use of business plans and operations for risk
evaluation.57 Seminars run by the Central Bank or by Russian and
foreign business schools are frequently ¢lled with bank workers learning, at times for the ¢rst time, the art of ¢nancial management or the
concept of depreciation.58 The fact that banks are sta¡ed by younger
professionals trained and socialized in the post-communist era helps
with behavioral change of banks: these younger professionals do not
carry the baggage of Soviet-era accounting practices or ¢nancial assumptions.
Not that behavior has changed completely. Some bankers (especially
elite bankers) have been loathe to give in to the Central Bank's rules
and have fought back ^ witness e¡orts to deny Paramonova con¢rmation beyond her status as temporary head of the Bank, and e¡orts by
bankers in 1998 to topple Sergei Kirienko's cabinet (because of his
stricter reforms and willingness to let weak banks die).59 Many banks
continue to survive on Russian T-bills and other forms of speculation;
weeding out weaker banks has been slow. However, change has occurred, and the most important factor in ¢nancial change is that the
Central Bank came to be a powerful and strong-willed player, in part
through political actions of reforms (e.g., Yeltsin pushing through
a new constitution in 1993 granting the Central Bank power and
autonomy) and through the will and actions of its chiefs (especially
Paramonova but even her successor Sergei Dubinin). There is some
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evidence that the Central Bank was successful with small banks, which
did not have the political or social capital to ward o¡ the Bank's
punishments. Hence, smaller banks have held steady during the recent
economic crisis.60 Further, occasional bank crises (in the autumn of
1995 and 1998) have led to more scrutiny of banks' operations. After
the most recent problems, when banks could not honor debts after
the collapse of the state's T-bill pyramid, the Central Bank and independent auditors are investigating more closely how banks operate.61
Even the Central Bank itself has come under scrunity by the Federal
Audit Chamber and the Prosecutor General for certain actions (illegal
or unprofessional use of interbank loans, ruble emissions, and the
like).62 The strong hand of the Bank brought about change; it is
probable that the bank will bring more changes, especially if its own
house it put in order.
In contrast, principles of ¢nance have not changed as rapidly for
industrial ¢rms. Problems with bankruptcy law deprived Russia of one
enforcement mechanism; weakness of other routes (liens or tracing
debt by ``piercing the corporate veil'') deprived actors of means to
force debt payments or focus on pro¢t. Further, understandings of
¢nance and debt derive from the Soviet era, when budgets were soft.
Managers did not code ¢nance as a key signal of performance;63
maintaining employment or cash-£ow (to pay wages) was more crucial.64 Money was obtained through ``pocket banks'' (opened and controlled by ¢rms) channeling funds to enterprises. With no strong central accounting mechanism, ¢nancial principles in industry changed
slowly ^ although changes were afoot.
Principles of production and exchange: Coping with demand
The ¢nancial sector has shown the (relatively) biggest shift to new
economic principles and practices, in no small part because the shift
in new principles was (relatively) smaller than elsewhere, and because
the Central Bank emerged as a mechanism able and willing to enforce
new principles and contribute to their rei¢cation (e.g., through sponsored seminars).65 For other activities and arenas, such as production
and sales, the change in principles has been more di¤cult. Previous
practices are more deeply embedded ^ for example, production was a
greater everyday concern in the Soviet era. Industrial ¢rms and small
¢rms are more decentralized, with no single policeman hovering over
them to introduce new principles and to discipline ¢rms that do not
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follow them. Even as privatization allowed a few elites or organizations
(Boris Berezovskii, Menatep) to build empires, most Russian ¢rms
remain within loose associations or on their own; and even the empires
have problems of coordination and control. Here, in the world of large
and small industrial and trading ¢rms, the transition has been problematic because of the institutional nature of power ^ it is dispersed.
This section examines change in principles of production and sales,
and because of its complexity requires more detail.
One could expect the state to enforce the new rules, but here legislation
and cadres' capabilities have not been up to par. Bankruptcy law has an
incentive against restructuring: management gets replaced by a new
team. For political reasons (unemployment) the state has been loath to
use bankruptcy, and a political culture expecting some paternalism has
made application of bankruptcy tenuous. Small ¢rms can close and
reopen quickly, and the legal basis allowing creditors to ``pierce the
corporate veil'' and follow the paper trail is weak. When legislation is
not so problematic, state cadres may be. Interviewed entrepeneurs and
managers express disillusionment over the inability of the state to
enforce laws, such as protection, as a consequence enhancing the
reputation of the ma¢ia for ful¢lling this need. Cadres' understandings
of market-based laws and logics prevent competent enforcement; often
respondents told me of incompetent or corrupt police, legal loopholes
for evading bankruptcy, or wildly di¡ering answers from di¡erent
tax inspectors to the same question. Given institutional collapse and
confusion over rules, other mechanisms enforcing change must be
created.66
In developed capitalism, the state's e¡orts are complemented by those
of actors themselves, from cultural isomorphism to market demand.
Demand is a crucial component shaping behavior, for it acts to correct
behavior (although to a lesser extent than in economic theory) and its
interpretation sets strategies. Lowered demands leads to less income
and acts as a warning that something might be wrong with goods or
strategies. Further, while demand is assumed (a ``natural'' part of a
market economy), it is far from taken for granted; beyond the smalltime street-corner merchants, economic actors partake in active study
of demand ^ potential target markets, what they want, how much are
they willing to pay. Contemporary capitalism involves deducing existing supply-demand equilibrium before actually engaging in production
and sales.67 Nowhere else is Weber's equation of capitalism and rationalization stronger than in marketing: the rationalized process of study
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(obtaining and analyzing data) to optimize exchange and production,
the eyes of the ¢rm out onto the market.68 Principles of production
and sales are grounded to an extent in accounting for viable demand.
For Russian managers, the principles of production and sales were far
di¡erent. The Soviet system rewarded managers for ful¢lling Plan
quotas. Demand was already guaranteed by Moscow arti¢cially and
thus assumed to be. Further, production for its own sake was the
driving force in economic activity ^ again no surprise, given the Plancentered Soviet system. The experience and legacies of the Soviet-era
economy and its tool kit o¡ered a production-centered prism ^ production based on assumed demand, new products thought up because
sales meant £ooding the market with new goods (regardless of demand).
In a sense, demand was taken for granted but not taken seriously.
We notice this incongruence between socialist and capitalist principles
in one example from my observations of small ¢rms, in this case of an
economics institute and publishing house. Demand was assumed but
also ignored in production calculations; while the managers (economists by training) adopted the capitalist dictum of pro¢t maximization, con£icting understandings and models confounded this goal ^
for example, focusing on production costs while assuming demand or
failing to understand that demand must be taken into account. The
director of the publishing house decided to publish a (high-quality)
economics dictionary. Rather than ¢rst ¢gure out how many units to
make, at what price, and for what market segment, the book was
drafted and 100,000 units printed at once, not because of expected
market demand, but because the publisher o¡ered a discount on unit
cost. Only later, when weak demand foiled initial na|« ve expectations,
did the director consider the actual process of selling the dictionary.
A ``marketing'' position was created ^ a graduate student able to use
computer spread-sheets and who phoned various businesses and
schools in search of potential buyers. Alas, too late ^ copies of the
dictionary gathered dust in storage (until con¢scated in lieu of unpaid
debts).
Part of the problem was the distance between socialist and capitalist
principles of demand and production ^ a distance that, contrary to the
expectations of neoclassical economics, could not be covered quickly.
Certainly Western and new Russian experts helped the shift, as they
had better understanding of what demand and marketing meant in
theory and practice (formal and tacit knowledge). However, this did
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not guarantee such principles would be adopted and followed en
masse:
When directors of enterprises understand the impossibility of continuing the
output of old products and try to begin production of new goods, they run
into the problem of studying the needs of consumers, but they have neither
the needed number of specialists at the ¢rm, nor independent marketing
services for the solution of such a problem. Russian industry still has not
acclimated to the rule ``produce that which will be bought, not sell that which
you make.'' 69

Part of the problem ^ crucial to adjustment ^ was the absence of a
powerful mechanism to select for actors who understood and followed
new principles. Neoclassical economics suggests that actors who
(somehow) do not follow rules of pro¢t and e¤ciency be forced to exit
the market. However, in the West, bankruptcy, investment procedures
(and experts who analyze and interpret behavior and advise on investment), and training enforce certain types of sales and production
models; these models are consistently activated, as a multitude of
actors play by the same rules and expect that others will as well. Such
ground rules and expectations were not immediately produced in Russia; indeed, their creation was at the heart of the transition. As a result,
previous conceptions, interpretations, and models of behavior carried
over from socialism into the new capitalist era untouched at ¢rst.
Given the dearth of experts and selection mechanisms to enforce behavior and punish those who did not exhibit it, Soviet-era principles
remained in force in the ¢rst years of the transition, after price and
trade liberalization; this can be seen in enterprise behavior in 1992,
and when the Gaidar regime took a hard-budget stand (lowering the
money supply and cutting or not delivering subsidies). Rather than
react to market signals and incentives, many managers continued business as usual of buying inputs and producing outputs.70 Whether an
input was needed or an output wanted, managers continued to order
and produce. Stockpiles mushroomed; managers had misjudged (or
never investigated) potential solvent demand. Firms replaced ``bureaucratic money'' (subsidies) with inter-enterprise credit.
The result of such a strategy was this: when one ¢rm could not unload
its goods for money (because the buyer was insolvent), it could not pay
its debts, and this debt followed the links back up the production chain.
Thus the ``inter-enterprise arrears crisis'' (krizis neplatezhei) threatened
Russian industry and acted as the ¢rst major shock needed to push
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change in principles of demand and production.71 Russian managers
spun their wheels but did start to get out of the cognitive mud. New
principles did come into being and did start to spread and change
behavior. Experience and shocks provoked change through negative
results from following particular principles or applying particular
measuring rods (e.g., output rather than pro¢t). Outside experts, Russian or foreign, lent their knowledge to Russian managers. Their help
ranged from just suggestions, such as creating a marketing department, to complex audits and business plans and in some cases outright
control of the ¢rm.72 This last method introduced direct power and
change. In the case of a tour ¢rm I observed, an American woman
(``Denise'') was made co-director and given strong backing by the
informal charismatic head of the ¢rm. She patiently introduced and
forced changes: rationalized organization (¢le-keeping, o¤ce management, procedure for ¢ling documents), impersonal methods of dealing
with clients (position to position rather than friend to friend), viewing
the ¢rm not as a source of rents (e.g., money for food and vodka) but
as something to be nurtured for its own sake. Denise had the power to
introduce and follow through with her changes in behavior at the ¢rm;
her partner, the Russian Ivan, resisted her changes, but was outnumbered by other workers (who went along with Denise) and the informal
head of the group who wielded charismatic in£uence and controlled
the ¢rm's money supply. Denise won.
Thus we see the Soviet and capitalist tool kits, the sources of change,
and potential mechanisms. What were the source of power that enforced the switch from one method of coding, interpreting, and formulating responses to the other? The case of Denise and the tour ¢rm
shows one method: a combination of direct dictation and teaching.
Usually the story is less straightforward; enforcing new principles was
more complicated. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state
could discipline and enforce principles (imperfectly) through its direct
ownership of enterprises, and the Communist Party through its control
of nomenklatura appointments could act as a disciplining body as
well.73 However, the collapse of centralized economic control (through
privatization, liberalization, or Yegor Gaidar's hands-o¡ policy ideology) deprived the state of enforcement mechanisms for quicker change
^ for example, a Communist Party truly dedicated to capitalist reform
might have been able to use its nomenklatura appointment function to
appoint younger managers (less socialized in socialist principles and
perhaps able to undergo Western business training).74 While the state
could not select for and enforce industrial behavior, another means
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was surfacing. With liberalization, money became one basis for the
economy. To purchase inputs (labor, energy, materials), a ¢rm needed
either money or barter, and after 1992 these were no longer automatically forthcoming from the state. Hence, ¢rms needed to obtain
income from sales ^ meaning that ¢rms had to orient production to
existing demand. If a ¢rm received no income (money or barter), it
would have to live on debt, which became problematic when most
industrial ¢rms did this, resulting in enormous inter-enterprise debt.
At heart, monetization of the Russian economy,75 when actors needed
money to maintain operation, acted as the power mechanism enforcing
changes in principles of production.76 As state funding dried up, banks
became ¢nancial wellsprings until 1994, when banks became more
concerned about bad loan portfolios and less inclined simply to lend
money to just any client.77
Unfortunately, monetization was not as e¤cient an enforcer as the
Central Bank for ¢nance. The di¡use nature of an enforcement
mechanism grounded in money and in aggregated exchange interactions between buyers and sellers (the classical economic mechanism
of supply and demand) made such change slow. Adding to enforcement
problems and confounding the switch to new capitalist principles was
the tenacity of previous economic understandings. In 1992 ¢rms had
freedom but soon found that production and sales, and hence pro¢t,
would not come automatically. ``So far the [sale] of ... products occurs
to a large degree blindly''; the market had to be studied, but how and
by whom? 78 At the end of 1992, general director Gennadyi Shchukin
of the electronics ¢rm Svetlana complained that ``not everyone understands that you need to work in a new way'' and that changes in activity
were occurring ``very slowly'', because ``there still lives the old approach to the formation of plans: make a report and then put the good
on the shelf.'' 79 This perception is reinforced by the attitudes of those
like an older shop£oor worker who stated, ``I am against the market.
I am not ready. The majority [of employees here] are old, patriotic ....
We have lived that way for seventy years. We were brought up that way,
and we are not able to reconstruct our psychology immediately.'' 80 The
director of the personnel department claimed that subdivision and
shop£oor chiefs had a weak understanding of ``economic freedom'' ^
``only among a few has the desire arisen to sit down with a pencil in
hand to count how much [an activity] will cost and will give....'' 81 In
another example, the Kirov factory had invested in a 35-horsepower
K-20 mini-tractor for the rising class of individual farmers. Kirov
managers felt they needed to produce up to 60,000 K-20 tractors per
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year. In hindsight, when the number of individual farmers barely
cracked 100,000 early on, this seems a bit nonsensical;82 yet the general
manager assumed there would be a fermerstvo and demand for the
K-20.83 In general, that the old psychology changed with di¤culty is
best put by one scholar of Russian enterprises and managers:
The psychological factor has great meaning for older generation directors,
who are oriented in their activity to ful¢llling tasks issued from above. The
main task for them is to obtain from their labor collective the realization of
proposed tasks; the problem of sales of produced goods is not of the highest
importance for them. Therefore, the necessity of creating new goods with
demand is put aside by these directors into second place. The primary
strategy is walking around the o¤ces in Moscow with the goal to convincing
the government to buy products that are obsolete or even not needed in
previous quantities. The main argument in such visits is, ``I have a labor
collective of several thousand. I need to feed them.'' 84

The initial problem of sales and distribution was perceived and framed
in terms of unful¢lled promise: a ¢rm's goods were of high quality
(even when not), had demand (buyers were placing orders, even if they
could not pay for them), and problems of sales resulted from in£ation
and buyers' lack of funds. The key problem, as envisioned in 1992 (and
persisting somewhat to 1995), was the macroeconomic environment
and state policies that had created the transitional mess.85 In 1992 and
into 1993, the problem of sales was thus interpreted as lack of money in
the system. Still managers hoped to increase revenues by assaulting the
market with their products, complementing ``traditional'' goods with
new ``unique'' goods that buyers would naturally want.86 Managers
assumed that, because there were orders (regardless of insolvency),
demand existed. One furniture entrepeneur in Tula remarked that his
¢rm had focused on the production process; little thought was given to
how they would sell their furniture (``We did not know how to sell'').87
Only when sales problems continued did he recognize the need to
search for clients ^ to use advertisements, to promote active word-ofmouth di¡usion of his reputation, to link up with clients who would
make repeated purchases.88
The split between emerging rules of monetization (need for payment
resources) and ``business as usual'' led to shocks that prodded changes
in perceptions and cognitive frameworks. As Dolgopiatova and Evseeva
noted, managers began to distinguish between ``demand'' (spros) and
``solvent demand'' (platezhesposobnyi spros).89 While this categorization
was problematic ^ ``many managers highlighted that their products
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were very much needed by consumers, but buyers `simply did not have
the money' to pay for them'' 90 ^ at least managers were aware that
payment for demand was important. By 1993 and 1994 most ¢rms
realized that waiting for government subsidies or solvent buyers to
come to them, patience and muddling through, producing for whomever ordered goods, and assuming that goods were of high quality and
naturally would have demand were not generating income and lifting
enterprises out of ¢nancial distress.
A further shift occurred with the appearance of the word ``marketing''
in the Russian lexicon. Even in late 1992, with rising ¢nancial problems, managers began to realize that marketing, study of the market,
was crucial: ``To experiment with the output of products without relying on study of the consumer market is very dangerous.'' 91 ``Marketing''
was understood in a broad sense as turning active attention to demand
and market conditions in order to increase sales ^ for example, advertising, such as that used by pyramid investment schemes. Marketing,
however, is more than £ashy advertisements and appeals to the na|« ve;
the capitalist conception of marketing is a systematic study of market
composition to gain information on potential demand and to rationalize the enterprise's economic surroundings so as to predict and plan
accordingly. Over time some Russians with this understanding of
``marketing'' did emerge. Yet if marketing was understood in principle
by some, it was not necessarily understood in practice by many ^ experts
able to collect and use data for marketing strategies were few. If such
experts were present, often the directors did not listen to them; this
was sometimes the case even in banks, where young graduate students
of economics practiced their trade, only to ¢nd that higher-ups preferred to give loans based on their own contacts, politics, or feelings.92
One reason for such slow adoption and incorporation of new understandings and practices was that decoupling hindered the rise of marketing and new understandings and strategies of demand and production.
Sociological neo-institutionalists note that ¢rms often copy policies
or structures seen as solutions to common problems or signals of
legitimacy. Yet copying does not mean implementing as originally
designed. Adopted forms and strategies may appear in super¢cial
form only, making little impact on actual practice; form and practice
are decoupled.93 That is, managers adopt new strategies but do not
have the tacit knowledge to bring them to fruition or incorporate
them into larger strategies and practices.94 We should expect that in
the transition ¢rms will copy new forms and strategies touted as
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market-logic solutions and practices in form; but because of continuity
of previous logics and the di¤culty of cultural change, actors will
exercise previous practices within those new forms.
Russian enterprises inherited planning departments from the Soviet
period, which were converted into marketing departments. Sometimes
the department was sta¡ed with young experts who knew marketing
techniques, and so they could use information from previous sales and
work out production and distribution plans. Other times marketing
was cruder; let me illustrate from the example of an electronics ¢rm.
In 1993 Baker and MacKenzie recommended they create a marketing
division. The assistant director for quality was told to create a marketing division. In early 1995 the division consisted of the assistant director and a few graduate students who knew how to work with computer
programs. The students would read the electronics trade journals and
visit other stores selling electronic goods, in order to ¢gure out what
the competitors' prices were so that the ¢rm could set their own prices
accordingly. Yet this was the extent of marketing. (When I asked the
assistant director if anything else was done, such as integrating marketing backward into production so the ¢rm would know what to
produce, he responded negatively.) The shipbuilder Almaz (Petersburg),
according to one study of the ¢rm, had no clear goals and strategies for
orienting production and sales; the ¢rm was still ``product-oriented'' ^
``production is the core function at Almaz, and it is strictly rules by the
Production Department which co-ordinates [sic] the material £ow, the
production and the quality control in the di¡erent workshops in the
company.'' 95 While institutions were changing, personnel were changing more slowly, resulting in a ``lack of market thinking'' due to the
``lack of quali¢ed business economists and marketing personnel.'' The
pressure to increase sales forced machine-maker Sverdlov to adopt
marketing strategies, but these were slow in being realized, since the
power mechanism (monetization and demand) did not work rapidly.
While ``marketing'' had been discussed at the Sverdlov machine-making enterprise in 1992 and 1993,96 serious discussion and action were
taken only by 1994, after an assistant director had been to the United
States and managers had met with representatives of the International
Executive Services Corps,97 when establishing a ``distribution network'' and servicing department was proposed.
The di¡use nature of enforcing new principles and the distance between old and new economic principles made change di¤cult. Monetization and the importance of income acted as a shock, but without
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bankruptcy they acted more as a hindrance than as a true disciplining
device. The opinion of traders on the stock market might have been
another disciplining mechanism, except that stocks were equated not
with money but with control, and so Russian ¢rms tended to rely more
on their own ¢nances, on debts, and on bank loans (from pocket
banks, those founded by an enterprise and under its control). In spite
of these problems, however, change was forthcoming. Managers
placed more emphasis on close study of markets and making strategic
alliances with important buyers ^ for example, producing for ¢rms
such as Gazprom or General Electric.
If lack of enforcement made initial change di¤cult, new factors arose
that could impede change further, because by 1995 certain principles
of production and exchange were becoming embedded in organizational practices and ¢elds, providing a power ¢eld that could reproduce and enforce both new and old principles. This is the ¢nancialindustrial group (¢nansovo-promyshlennaia gruppa, FPG), a group of
enterprises organized together into a larger coherent whole, with an
umbrella organization in the center owning shares in the participating
¢rms. FPGs come in two types, re£ecting di¡erent economic principles
and understandings of risk: the Financial FPG (Rosprom, Interros),
centered around banks and ¢nancial organizations, and the Defensive
FPG (FinProm, Progressinvest), centered around industrial organizations. For Financial FPGs, the drive was to lower investment risk
through diversi¢cation98 and to increase control over investment and
returns.
The Defensive FPG is crucial to our story. This type is created
voluntarily by the participating enterprises, often with the help of
local governments and based on Soviet-era ties between managers
and ministries (such as Konsensus, formed on the base of the Soviet
Ministry of Light Industry, or PAKT, created ``as a replacement for the
regional Communist Party network that had performed important
coordinating functions prior to 1990'').99 Unlike their Financial cousins,
Defensive FPG managers organized ties of exchange more tightly and
recreated a security blanket resembling that of Soviet-era Ministries.
Directors saw Defensive FPGs as a way to maintain links of production and sales and to pool sources, allowing them to resist the demand
mechanism of market disciplining. Such groups are able to increase
political capital and obtain money from the government or hold o¡
bankruptcy and tax collection; they can pool resources and create
``pocket banks'' as cash pools for FPG members. In short, the Defen-
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sive FPG acts to short-circuit the one existing power mechanism for
enforcing new principles of production and sales, and as a way of
reproducing older principles.
The dynamics of adaptation by individual managers or ¢rms is best left
for elsewhere. What is clear is that some ¢rms managed to adapt more
quickly than others; ¢rm size and industrial sector do not appear to be
as good at predicting adaptation as managers' own personal traits ^
for example, ``planning horizons'' (how long managers feel they will
stay in power), perception of the ¢rm (as parts or a uni¢ed whole),
learning style (through incentives or experience), networks, expectations about when the economic crisis will end (with optimists more
likely to introduce innovations), and degree of paternalism (sense of
duty to maintaining a social safety net).100 However, if we look at the
general process, we notice several stages in behavior. Socialist principles carried over after liberalization until confronted by shocks arising
from monetization, which neoclassical economics might expect. However, unlike neoclassical expectations, adjustment and change were not
automatic. Given weaknesses of bankruptcy, the relative unimportance of the bourse for management's decisions (as enterprise income
is more likely to come from sales than from the stock and bond market),
lack of direct mechanisms of control or punishment of managers,
changes in principles of production and sales were slower and less
straightforward. For banks, Tatiana Paramonova could issue directives
and force banks to reshape their behavior along new lines. Beyond the
monetized economy, there was no mechanism to force quick changes
or to weed out managers who did not immediately understand solvent
demand and the need for seriously linking marketing to production.
This was compounded by the fact that the shift from socialist to
capitalist principles of sales and production was greater than for banks
(which still had di¤culties shifting from speculation to reliance on
sound practices). The distance of shift, coupled with the lack of a
coherent enforcement mechanism, meant a tortured path for industry.
However, at least one mechanism, the need for money, was at work.
More problematic was the situation within ¢rms, where authority
crumbled and new principles were not readily apparent.
Principles of organization: Enterprise restructuring
The story of enterprise reorganization is paradoxical. On the one hand,
this should be a straightforward story. Models of restructuring were
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fairly simple ^ giving enterprise subdivisions autonomy in order to
increase e¤ciency. Authority also appeared simple ^ management
retained its commanding position. However, in reality restructuring
opened the £oodgates for confusion and contention, as restructuring
broke bonds of power and competing understandings of natural and
moral order within the ¢rm emerged. While one imagines enterprises
as rationalized hierarchy and operative systems of discipline, we cannot assume perfect authority within the ¢rm: not only is authority
contested, but often the rational schema does not work as it should.
Here I do not argue with Clarke, Burawoy, and Krotov, and others that
relations within the Soviet and Russian ¢rms were chaotic or con£ictridden.101 I want to show the implication of these relations: con£icting
models and broken authority made restructuring a nightmare. Initial
reforms changed ¢rm structure, but under the surface former practices
(e.g., Soviet-era paternalism) hindered reform; imposing new organizational frameworks (such as a new hierarchy of command and discipline) was di¤cult. The Russian ¢rm outwardly looked modern, but
remained at heart a more chaotic version of its former Soviet self.
Enterprise restructuring was intended to increase responsiveness and
e¤ciency. Shop£oors were made ¢nancially autonomous and responsible small ¢rms (MP, maloe predpriiatie) and leased ¢rms (AP, arendnoe predpriiatie). The promise of higher pro¢ts and wages and the
bankruptcy threat were supposed to encourage e¤ciency. Employees
were working ``under the table'' (nalevo) for their own gain; thus the
manager of one ¢rm argued, ``The idea of any reorganization arises
from the necessity to restructure ... so that [the new system] brings
together the goals of the enterprise and the goal of each worker, to
arouse the interests of each person in the attainment of the end goals of
the entire enterprise.'' 102 Thus managers hoped to tap into the income
stream of the shadow economy.
Restructuring, however, had unexpected outcomes, rupturing relations
between subdivisions and opening the door to di¡erent models of
organizational reconstruction. The new autonomy involved negotiating contracts with other subdivisions within the same ¢rm, rather than
going through a bureaucratic hierarchy. This broke old constraints and,
in a sense, old rituals of interaction; but the new basis and rituals of
interaction had not yet been perfected. As a result, contradictions and
tensions between individual subdivisions or MPs arose: problems of
coordinating, facilitating, and enforcing exchange and payment. Each
MP had its own interests and problems; setting up transfers of goods
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and payments was more problematic than setting up prices, negotiated
by the MPs themselves. The ground rules of exchange and organization
(hierarchy of authority) within the ¢rm remained confused, because
the models were confused, because di¡erent models were promoted by
di¡erent groups, and because no one group had the power to enforce
its claims. For example, restructuring at the machine-maker Sverdlov
revealed problems: ``... in the activity of [newly-created MPs] ... there
are many problems, the most important of which is to organize relations with other shop£oors and subdivisions, to adjust accounts and
price-setting.'' 103 With no previous experience or models, how were
individual subdivisions, now with their own responsibilities, to organize
and enforce contractual relations between themselves? Even through
1994 the problem of contractual relations between MPs continued and
had ``frozen work'' and led to ``friction'' between the various units.104
The situation at the Kirov tractor works also reveals problems of
exchange between subdivisions during the course of restructuring. The
reorganization of Kirov from one large factory with subdivisions into
a group of ``mini-factories'' had, in the words of one shop£oor boss,
``complicated ... the general production situation at Kirov [and] the
relations between shop£oors of di¡erent productions,'' at times because
of production problems and £aws in supplies from other shop£oors or
mini-factories.105 Another shop£oor boss complained that the transition to autonomy was one thing in word, but another in deed; getting
his subordinates to economize and to understand their new responsibilities was di¤cult enough, and when others in the enterprise changed
their titles and duties, coordinating activity was even more di¤cult.106
Within the ¢rm, managers did not have sweeping authority. First,
commercialization and privatization, as well as AP creation, required
majority vote by employees and allowed them to hold shop£oor meetings, where workers discussed both the policies at hand and, inevitably,
their grievances and goals. This in itself led to con£icts ^ for example,
at the Sverdlov enterprise workers in one shop£oor voted against
becoming an AP because they suspected the administration would use
this plan to increase their own privileges at the workers' expense.107
With privatization workers became part owners of the ¢rm; management could only rule with some concord with employees. At times
workers received the ¢nal vote over whether a ¢rm would remain a
single unity. This was the case at Petersburg's electronics ¢rm Positron,
where the various factories and shop£oors had the right to privatize
together or as independent units. Positron's general director, Iurii
Blokhin, preferred Positron to privatize as an entity; however, factory

408
and shop£oor chiefs (and line employees) distrusted Blokhin, and
often each other. The result: 1992 was a year of heated debates and
con£ict, at heart over who had the right to control or do what. Con£ict
ended when half of Positron privatized independently, leaving the
enterprise and going it alone in the cruel market.108 Managers' hands
were tied as restructuring was beginning. When the bureaucratic, hierarchical ¢rm was broken into individual units, power faded, but so did
the conception of what the ¢rm should look like.
Restructuring was hindered from another direction as well. Managers
introduced reforms to increase performance; subdivisions were threatened with bankruptcy and rewarded with pro¢t. Yet managers could
not bring themselves to shut down loss-making subdivisions because
of a paternalist legacy. In the Soviet era, managers were not simply
glori¢ed accountants but were also ``fathers'' of the factory, charged
both with ful¢lling Plan quotas and with caring for their workers'
livelihood. Paternalism survived into the present, partly because it was
not criticized (as state ownership had been) and retained legitimacy:
employees and managers expected paternalism. Bankruptcy, downsizing, or discontinuing social services ran into problems both from
law109 and from the paternalistic creed.110 Thus, structural changes
could be introduced, but without the power to punish, managers'
market threats remained empty. While laws and employee shareholding
bound managers' hands, managers themselves could not bring themselves to enforce a new discipline.
Given problems of interaction and the need to create some sense of
order of what the new Russian ¢rm should look like, solutions were
put forward from di¡erent corners. But given that di¡erent solutions
re£ected the interests and ideas of their holders, con£ict and confusion
resulted. One solution adopted by most ¢rms was the creation of the
holding company (kholding), putting all MPs, and APs under one
administrative roof, to create some semblance of authority. Two factors
drove reintegration in 1992 and 1993. The ¢rst factor was the perceived
need, shared by directors and MP bosses, to create some kind of safety
net. This was a central point in managers' and shop£oor chiefs' thinking and a holdover from Soviet cultural tool kits: the enterprise not just
as a business entity but as a welfare state. By maintaining an overall
structure, the MPs that were having di¤culties could retain traditional
purchasers within the conglomerate. For example, research institutes
that could not survive on their own could still work for more successful
subdivisions within the kholding. At Sverdlov, for example, some sub-
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divisions came on hard times after 1992 and 1993; while they still
cherished some degree of independence, they also realized that, with
more than half of their orders coming from the mother ¢rm and its
MPs, staying within the overall kholding structure was a way of keeping a£oat.111 Further, the kholding was a familiar cousin to Soviet-era
conglomerates, and the moral of multinational corporations was that
their strength derived precisely from their size and capacity. And all
this was legitimated by the presence, and success, of these organizational structures in the West: ``You remember the oft-repeated phrase
of an American teacher: `In order to compete on the market globally,
the enterprise should be large.' Such a principle we are trying to
provide.'' 112 Oddly, the large Soviet-era ``monsters,'' vili¢ed as ine¤cient and unnatural, were reconstituted as kholding and praised as the
necessary way to retain production ties (and thus reduce risk) and
productive capacity (to compete with foreign ¢rms). Also, the kholding,
from administration's point of view, would strengthen control and cut
down on confusion by creating a system of authority.
Yet in spite of recentralizing authority through the holding company,
enterprise structure and authority remained problematic; creating a
kholding did not automatically create order. Problems of authority
persisted between subunits and between employees and central management. Relations between subdivisions were exacerbated by changing
structure and authority within the ¢rm. Earlier they were productionoriented subdivisions of the same unit; now they were separate, held
together by the overarching central holding company. At heart was the
problem not only of coordination, but of lack of any enforcement
between subdivisions. With restructuring came new and not entirely
worked out rules of the game; in particular, enforcement of exchange
between subdivisions became a sore spot. For example, one MP chief
noted that the rights and duties of di¡erent subunits within the Svetlana
joint-stock company (soon to be a kholding) had yet to be resolved.113
The Svetlana and Sverdlov enterprises, after years of restructuring into
independent entities and then back into uni¢ed kholding, continued
grappling with the question of what the ¢rm should look like internally.
The search for a viable organizational form and its rules of command
remained problematic even in July 1997.114
In short, enterprise restructuring, undertaken to promote e¤ciency,
in the end undermined authority. Restructuring, in theory, called on
the market to reward and penalize in order to entice shop£oor bosses
and workers to be more e¤cient in production and market search.
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However, general directors were loathe to let their subdivisions be
penalized; paternalism and perceptions that the Russian economy
was not a market but instead chaos intertwined in directors' minds,
and as a result, while they were content to let market penalties threaten
(and thus stimulate) shop£oor activity, they feared that these market
penalties would go too far and swallow up the subdivisions, and then
the ¢rm. Further, self-enforcement was not the norm among shop£oor
bosses. While they approved the idea of more autonomy, the data seem
to show that they took no steps of their own to increase productivity
and e¤ciency. On the contrary, shop£oor bosses complained that they
could not enforce responsibility among their workers: the constant
complaints about wasting water or light, about theft and underground
production, attest in part to the inability of shop£oor bosses to take
matters fully into their own hands. Second, placing subdivisions on
contractual relations with each other created chaos. as no mechanism
of enforcement was available. General directors, loathe to lose important shop£oor bosses, could do little more than pound their shoes on
the podium and exhort their comrades to work harder and to cooperate in the name of the enterprise's greater good.
Conclusion: Notes on a framework of transition and economic change
Neoclassical theories, applied in the guise of shock therapy, assume an
invisible hand (competitive and investment pressures, bankruptcy, the
pro¢t imperative) and e¤ciency-centered Darwinian selection imposing market structure and practice. In reality, the market's complex
rules, categories, and structures are created and imposed through
power structures; invisible hands and selection mechanisms do not
just rise out of theories and textbooks but must be created. This is
easier said than done, however, given that authority mechanisms may
also be in £ux.
What lessons for economic change have been learned from Russia's
Great Transformation?
à

The transition is a process ^ more exactly, a set of processes with
their own dynamics. These processes are path dependent, but not
totally.115 Changes arise from imposition of models worked out bit
by bit, as di¡erent understandings collide. Enforcement mechanisms must be created, through trial-and-error of law and private
action. This process of social learning and imposition involves in-
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teraction between old and new principles of understanding and
behavior, leading to potential confusion, and between di¡erent
actors' models and understandings, leading to con£ict. Further,
processes of change di¡er across arenas, leading to a multidimensional (and problematic) transition process.
The transition is about power and culture. Culture forms the basis
and understandings for new practices and organization. But if new
models of rules are legislated, there is no guarantee they will become
embedded in procedures and practices making up the foundation of
a new economic order. Power is crucial for reifying models and
understandings into relations of control, procedures, and practices.
Cultural models and structures of power will have di¡erent degrees
of coherence and di¡erent rates of change across di¡erent ¢elds of
economic activity, depending on preexisting structures and models
and historical accident (e.g., that the state and Central Bank focused
more on ¢nance rather than bankruptcy or managerial training). In
¢nance, new principles were carried by younger experts, but they
were also enforced by the Central Bank, with the authority and the
will to impose new rules.

Principles of production and organization, on the other hand, were
introduced and embedded with more di¤culty. Certainly isomorphic
pressures were at work, e.g., new experts with new ideas (in the case of
marketing), or shocks from failed strategies of sales and organization
(resulting in loss or in confusion within the ¢rm). However, implementing these new principles has been far from easy, as these enforcement
mechanisms ^ waiting for one buyer down the production chain to lack
the money or will to buy a good, or awaiting experts to work their way
up the ladder ^ do not lead to automatic shifts in principles. In the
absence of mechanisms that judge and then reward or punish ^ bankruptcy and stock markets as two potential examples, or investment and
command by state technocrats (e.g., as in South Korea) ^ change will
be slower and confused, leading to a complicated landscape of a
transition requiring decades rather than years. Creating a market is a
long gestation and painful labor.
Not that no change has occurred. As we saw with demand and production, managers learned through experience that demand was more
complex than assumed. Concepts of marketing had been worked out
in other capitalist nations and transported to Russian soil by foreign or
Russian experts or by the business media (pace Gerschenkron, an
advantage of backwardness). But more time is needed for capitalist
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principles and practices to take hold; returning to old principles cannot be ruled out (e.g., calling on the state for coddling of investment
and protection). Given the lack of strong authority and enforcement,
we should expect that a shift in principles requires a change in generational cohort ^ not unfamiliar in the West, where generational shifts
are one mechanism behind changing conceptions of control.116 Change
in models depends on how they are embedded in social practices and
organizations. Defensive FPGs, run by older ``Red Directors'' (Communist-era managers), appear to follow Soviet models: uniting enterprises in related sectors and production links to support familiar practices. This makes sense: Red Directors are Soviet creatures, for whom
success came from ful¢lling output quotas and economic categories
were of output rather than ¢nancial value. Defensive FPGs reproduce
Soviet-era practices and models. Financial FPGs are children of new
private banks run by younger managers trained in ¢nance or having
little experience in Soviet-era manufacturing. This FPG socially embeds newer capitalist practices; if there is a market future in Russia, it
is linked to these new empires and their ability to in£uence (directly or
indirectly) the Russian economy.117
The crucial lesson of the transition is that the crux of social change is
the nexus of culture and power. Culture provides interpretations and
models of action; power provides enforcement for imposing shared
culture ^ corresponding roughly to legislation and implementation.118
A transition is a social reconstruction of reality and the creation of a
new hegemony. When power is gained by those with the will to use it,
resulting rei¢cations will favor those wielding power, an outcome
predicted by political economy. However, power may not be concentrated; in this case the new system will be a mesh of old and new, and
the process of winnowing, central to selection, will be based both on
obeying rules and on simple luck. Decoupling can hinder the transformation of ground rules. Change in orientations to demand or enterprise organization will take years (a generation?) before ground rules
stabilize. Unfortunately, neo-orthodox reforms deprived the state of
economic levers and left a power vacuum. Market-building requires
culture-building, which in turn requires power-building; alas, the invisible hand of power was assumed.119 Had they read more Weber and
less Friedman, reformers and their Western advisors could have understood these di¤culties.
This leads to a bitter irony in Russia's case: to construct their market,
Russians may not need an iron ¢st, but they do need coherence and
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authority ^ an elite with coherent vision and the ability and will to
create economic order. Russians may need those from whose legacy
they £ee, the Bolsheviks. This does not mean that we should hope for
market Bolsheviks; there is no guarantee they would create an e¤cient
and just economy. If anything, Weberians and dependency theorists
should be happy that their models are being vindicated, as reformist
Russia gives birth to a new power elite concerned more with what
Weber called ``piracy.'' 120 One can only feel a sense of pathos ^ a quick
leap into the market may have required a complete revolution with
Stalinist methods of reconstruction, while gradualist policies would
founder on the rocks of confusion and con£ict, forcing average Russians to su¡er years of pain. Had Weberian tools been used, perhaps
we could have anticipated these problems; but the disturbing fact
remains that the pathway to the promised land is crowded with thorns,
beasts of prey, and human error. It is not a pretty picture ^ but the
landscape after a revolution seldom is.
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Notes
1. Herbert Bowles and Samuel Gintis, Democracy and Capitalism (New York: Basic
Books, 1986), 89.
2. While economic change and transitions need not lead to capitalism, the speci¢c
transition examined here involves creating a ``capitalist market.'' Thus, just what is
capitalism? Do we understand capitalism in institutional-structural terms (e.g., as
private property controlled by non-state actors) or in institutional-cultural terms
(e.g., as a rationalized economic system with no cultural barriers to exchange)?
While I do not attempt to provide a de¢nitive answer here, I accept that capitalism
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4.

5.

6.

7.

has both a structural and a cultural component. Di¡erent variants of capitalism,
e.g., state-centered (Japan or South Korea) or enterprise-centered (United States),
appear to share certain cultural or strategic characteristics that Weber noted
(e.g., rationalized practices, rationalized study of surroundings in order to control
them, and formalized roles and positions).
Peter Murrell, ``Can Neoclassical Economics Underpin the Reform of Centrally
Planned Economies?'' Journal of Economic Perspectives 4 (1991): 59^76, and
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A¡airs 9/2 (1993): 111^140; Joseph Brada, ``The Transformation from Communism to Capitalism: How Far? How Fast?'' Post-Soviet A¡airs 2 (1993): 87^110;
Ivan Szelenyi and Szonja Szelenyi, ``Circulation or Reproduction of Elites During
the Postcommunist Transformation of Eastern Europe,'' Theory and Society 24/5
(1995): 615^638; Gil Eyal, Ivan Szelenyi, and Eleanor Townsley, ``The Theory of
Post-Communist Managerialism,'' New Left Review 222 (March/April 1997),
60^92; John Campbell, ``An Institutional Analysis of Fiscal Reform in Postcommunist Europe,'' Theory and Society 25/1 (1996): 45^84; Juliet Johnson, ``Fistful
of Rubles,'' Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 1997; the contributions to
Gernot Garber and David Stark, editors, Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); David Stark, ``Path Dependence
and Privatization Strategies in East Central Europe,'' East European Politics and
Societies 6 (1992): 17^51; Joseph Blasi, Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse,
Kremlin Capitalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).
This is not the place for a full (or even partial) review of the work on market
transitions. For an overview of the logic and conclusions of much of this and
related work, see the following: Miguel Centeno, ``Between Rocky Markets and
Hard Democracies,'' Annual Review of Sociology 20 (1994): 125^147; Andrew
Walder, ``Markets and Inequality in Transitional Economics: Toward Testable
Theories,'' American Journal of Sociology 101/1 (1996): 1060^1073; Alice H.
Amsden, Jacek Kochanowicz, and Lance Taylor, The Market Meets its Match:
Restructuring the Economies of Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1994).
I do not deny the role of elites and power politics, and the events of autumn 1998
demonstrate their importance: elite rebellion against Sergei Kirienko's stricter tax
policies and reforms, and Yeltsin's subsequent surrender to them and his replacement of Kirienko with consummate insiders Viktor Chernomyrdin and Yevgenii
Primakov. However, elite politics do not automatically shape all actions and
strategies by the remaining 99 percent of economic actors. We must be aware of
elite politics and structural outcomes, but we cannot leave the picture at that alone
^ we must look at how the vast majority of Russian businessmen take part in
reconstructing and reproducing a new economic system.
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1976); E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New
York: Pantheon, 1964); Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon
Hill, 1944); Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (Glencoe, IL: Free
Press, 1933), trans. George Simpson; Samuel Huntington, Political Order in
Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); Barrington Moore,
The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
This is the theoretical strategy often employed by macroscopical approaches, such
as that of Barrington Moore, Social Origins, and Theda Skocpol, States and Social
Revolutions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
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8. See for example the frameworks used by Charles Tilly, Popular Contention in Great
Britain (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995) and John Marko¡, The
Abolition of Feudalism (University Park: Penn State Press, 1997). See also Mustafa
Emirbayer, ``Manifesto for a Relational Sociology,''American Journal of Sociology
103/2 (September 1997): 281^317. For an interesting empirical (as opposed to
theoretical) argument for focusing on process ^ especially on the importance of
contingency and tactics ^ see James McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1988), Conclusion.
9. I draw here on Max Weber, especially General Economic History, and contemporary neo-Weberian works, e.g., Gary Hamilton and Nicole Woolsey Biggart,
``Market, Culture, and Authority: A Comparative Analysis of Management and
Organization in the Far East,'' American Journal of Sociology 94 (Supplement,
1988): S52^S94.
10. See, for example, the chapters collected in Christopher Clague and C. Gordon
Rausser, Emerging Market Economies in Eastern Europe (Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1992).
11. Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1990); Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discourse (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1989).
12. In this way, incentives are embedded in cultural understandings. However, we
must avoid oversimplistic models where culture is a magic wand explaining residual
variance; but simply to brush aside any cultural explanation, as Burawoy appears
to do, also oversimpli¢es the transitional process. Michael Burawoy, ``Review
Essay: The Soviet Descent into Capitalism,'' American Journal of Sociology 102/5
(March 1997): 1430^1444 (esp. 1438).
13. Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (New
York: Doubleday, 1966); Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control;
Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discourse. Neoinstitutionalists (e.g., Paul
DiMaggio and Walter Powell) include power ^ isomorphism derives from power
sources (e.g., state coercion, professional pressure) ^ but must develop power
further. For example, Frank Dobbin shows the importance of cultural constructions without asking how power ¢ts into the picture ^ an extremely detracting
weakness when one asks how change occurs. See Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
14. I do not deny the importance of social capital and social embeddedness; however,
they act as conduits for transmitting and reinforcing ultimate cultural concepts.
Further, the creation and rei¢cation of economic institutions requires a move
away from social ties to formal rules. Finally, social capital also has cultural roots
^ what networks and ties mean in terms of relations, what a strong or weak tie is,
what can be expected or demanded, etc. For concern over space I do not address
social capital and economic change here and it has been explored elsewhere: see
the contributions to Gernot Garber and David Stark, editors, Restructuring Networks in Post-Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
15. See Miguel Centeno, Democracy Within Reason (University Park: Penn State
Press, 1994).
16. This does not mean that selection necessarily is complete; and this especially does
not mean that the outcome will be an economically e¤cient set of practices. New
principles may be economically ine¤cient but politically e¤cient (or expedient);
or they may simply conform to the whims of those with power in that economic
¢eld.

416
17. I have chosen the Russian case for several reasons: 1) I am familiar with the
language, culture, and history, and so when embarking on a study of transitions it
made sense to focus there; 2) The Russian case is more problematic than most
because communism was strongest in Russia, not only because it was home-grown
(and hence more legitimate than elsewhere) but also because Russia and former
Soviet republics exhibited the longest history, giving the communist economic
practices the strongest roots there.
18. Economic sociology has tried to reorient analysis with some success. Social embeddedness (social capital, networks) appears to dominate discourse. Some economic sociology has focused on power or culture: for example, William Roy,
Socializing Capital (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Fligstein, The
Transformation of Corporate Control; Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy;
Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child (New York: Basic Books, 1985). The
best source of ideas and inspiration may come less from economic sociology than
from political sociology, which has focused more on process, power, and culture
(in no small part because it has not been distracted by the same interdisciplinary
tug-of-war in which economic sociology ¢nds itself with economics). The most
relevant political sociology literature concerns revolutions ^ the political relative
to transitions (especially in Eastern Europe) and economic change. Those works
most in£uential on this article are John Marko¡'s The End of Feudalism, Charles
Tilly's Popular Contention in Great Britain, Lynn Hunt's Politics, Culture, and
Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984),
and Liah Greenfeld's Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1992).
19. David Stark and Laszlo Bruszt, Postsocialist Pathways (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1998). Gernot Garber and David Stark, editors, Restructuring
Networks in Post-Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
20. This problem may be less signi¢cant for Eastern Europe than the former U.S.S.R.
because institutional legacies of legal, formal pseudo-market structures were more
prominent in Hungary or Poland than in the U.S.S.R.
21. Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control, and ``Markets as Politics:
A Political-Cultural Approach to Market Institutions,'' American Sociological
Review 61 (1996): 656^673.
22. For example, Max Weber, General Economic History (Glencoe, IL: Free Press,
1950), trans. Frank Knight; see also Randall Collins, ``Weber's Last Theory of
Capitalism,'' in Mark Granovetter and Richard Swedberg, editors, The Sociology
of Economic Life (Boulder: Westview, 1991). For another account of the rise of
economic ground rules, see William Reddy, The Rise of Market Culture (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
23. Alec Nove, The Soviet Economic System (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1980); Joseph
Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet Industry (Cambridge: MIT Press,
1976).
24. Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, ``The Iron Cage Revisited,'' in Walter Powell
and Paul DiMaggio, editors, The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
25. Fligstein suggests this as one means by which new conceptions of control spread ^
for example, the rise of professionally-trained MBAs led to the rise of the ¢nancial
conception of control.
26. See Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
27. One reason for debt arrears is that payment of past debts is often ignored (while
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payment up front for the present purchase may be demanded). Because bankruptcy
is problematic and actors often are loathe to use it (for fear that others would use it
on them) the only other factor a¡ecting payment is resource dependency. Firms
need money or goods for purchase, and so they become more concerned with
present income. This need for income ^ imposed by monetization of the economy
and the imperative to have something on hand in order to make a purchase ^ did
impose a change in principles of production and sales. However, because bankruptcy has not been used widely, debt remains coded as secondary to other issues,
such as maintaining the factory social safety net and employment.
See Lewis Siegelbaum, Stakhanovism and the Politics of Productivity (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1988).
This is the basic logic of neo-classical economics: bankruptcy, free movement of
inputs (e.g., ¢nancial investment), cost-accounting, and free movement of labor
(involving unemployment) all contribute to maintaining discipline. Firms must act
e¤ciently if they are to make pro¢t and survive in competition, and ¢rms must
produce pro¢t if they are to continue existence and obtain investment down
the line. Weber noted the importance of discipline for capitalism, especially a
rationalizing form of discipline. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism (New York: Scribner's, 1976), and General Economic History.
I leave out one dimension of power ¢elds: central versus regional governments.
There is an obvious di¡erence in political activity across regional governments,
although its degree of importance is not entirely clear. However, I omit discussion
of regional political variation for the following reasons: 1) I am trying to discuss
actual economic activity rather than policies; 2) I am trying to show the creation
of new economic principles, and regional governments tend to in£uence incentives
more than perceptions; 3) To include this discussion would make this article
longer and more cumbersome than it need be. Inclusion of regional governmental
variation is best left for elsewhere.
See David Lipton and Je¡rey Sachs, ``Creating a Market Economy in Eastern
Europe: The Case of Poland,'' Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1 (1990):
75^147; Christopher Clague and C. Gordon Rausser, Emerging Market Economies
in Eastern Europe.
For a similar criticism see Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995), chapter 1.
Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989) and
``Taiwan's Economic History: A Case of Etatisme and a Challenge to Dependency
Theory,'' in Robert Bates, editor, Toward a Political Economy of Development
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Miguel Centeno, Democracy
Within Reason (University Park: Penn State Press, 1994); Peter Evans, Embedded
Autonomy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). A classic formulation is
Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon
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Theory of Capitalism.''
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bank into the ground to get rich, or is it running a healthy bank and slowly
accumulating both pro¢t and prestige? It is here that a ``hard'' version of rational
choice, relying solely on exogenous objective measurements of utility, runs into
trouble.
52. See, for example: ``Erlan,'' Kommersant (on-line) #10, 3/21/95; ``Aktual'naia
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of bankruptcy through 1995 and early 1996, they were under little pressure to pay
o¡ their loans (and hence change behavior) because Northern Trade did not
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``30,000'' placed in the debit column. The room erupted: why 30,000, why in the
debit column, where did depreciation come from? Only a few individuals shook
their heads and snickered at their colleagues.
59. New York Times, 8/27/98, 1.

420
60. ``Banky: kto vyzhivet?'' Argumenty i fakty #37 (1998): 6. For a slightly di¡erent
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Entrepreneurs, ``Ekonomike nuzhny tselevye gosudarstvennye orientiry,'' Ekonomist #4 (1994): 40^48. Lipsits describes the problems ¢rms have had ¢nding
outlets for selling their own goods. In one memorable case, a perfume maker could
not sell his goods through independent wholesalers and the retailers; the drop in
demand for his goods threatened the maker of the perfume bottles, who took it
upon himself to set up a network for distributing the perfume to Russian stores. In
another case, a clothing manufacturer had to send some workers in a truck to
drive around Russia in search of stores that would buy the clothes. See also I.
Gurkov and Ie. Avraamova, ``Strategii vyzhivaniia promyshlennykh predpriiatii v
novykh usloviiakh,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #6 (1995): 24.
67. Although this is actually more complex: see Alan Blinder et al., Asking About
Prices: A New Approach to Understanding Price Stickiness (New York: Russell
Sage, 1998).
68. Max Weber, General Economic History; see also Fligstein, The Transformation of
Corporate Control, chapter 4. This is also central to Alfred Chandler's interpretation of business history: see his The Visible Hand (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1977) and Scale and Scope (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990).
The rationalization thesis does have its critics, such as Fernand Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th^18th Century,Vol. 2: The Wheels of Commerce (Berkeley:
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University of California Press, 1992), 400^402, 566^568. However, if the rationalization thesis is thought of in terms of formalization, control, and discipline,
then Weber receives support from Michele Foucault. My thanks to Miguel Centeno
for pointing out the links between capitalism and discipline (and thus rationalization) and Weber and Foucault. For a contrary empirical view on rationalization,
see Melville Dalton, Men who Manage (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959).
S. Tsukhlo, ``Formirovanie obemov i struktury vypuska rossiiskikh promyshlennykh predpriiatii,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #6 (1995): 36.
See E. Belianova, ``Motivatsiia i povedenie rossiiskikh predpriiatii,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #6 (1995): 15^21; T. Dolgopiatova and I. Evseeva, ``Ekonomicheskoe
povedenie promyshlennykh predpriiatii v perkhodnoi ekonomike,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #8 (1994): 40^50; Bary Ickes and Randi Ryterman, ``The Interenterprise
Arrears Crisis in Russia,'' Post-Soviet A¡airs 8 (1992): 331^361.
This shock has been mitigated by the widespread use of barter. While the percentage of transactions conducted in barter will probably never be precisely known, it
is large ^ up to 70 percent of transactions for some companies. The result of barter
has been that perceptions of solvency and demand (discussed later) have been
a¡ected: a ¢rm may not have cash, but it has goods, and hence can pay for orders.
In a sense, the use of barter has watered down the impulse of monetization to
enforce new principles of production and sales.
Examples of these include a Petersburg electronics ¢rm where the author conducted
interviews, the Sverdlov machine-making plant, and the Baltika beer enterprise in
St. Petersburg.
Not that these mechanisms (state and CPSU) were perfect; especially in the
Brezhnev era, disciplining became less of a priority. Further, state and Party
cadres had di¤culty enforcing quasi-market practices and principles before 1991
because 1) these cadres themselves either did not understand the principles or had
interests tied to previous practices, and 2) actual policies under Gorbachev were
often incoherent.
Note, as a contrast to Russia, the way Mexican technocrats were able to use the
state and PRI to attain power and then push through reforms; see Centeno,
Democracy Within Reason.
This was not an impossible shift, given that the Soviet economy was partially
monetized. Money was the medium of exchange; the supply of money was controlled from Moscow, resulting in canceled debts, for example, and soft budgets.
As I noted earlier, barter mitigated the impact of monetization, although far from
entirely.
For example, some pocket banks ^ banks created by groups of industrial ¢rms
primarily as a cheap and easy source of loans ^ became stingier lending to their
parents. Leningradskii stankostroitel', 7/13/93, 1.
Svetlana, 6/24/92, 2.
Svetlana, 1/13/93, 1.
Svetlana, 6/3/93, 4.
Svetlana, 11/3/93, 2.
Kirovets #8, 1/16/92, 1.
Kirovets #60, 3/31/92, 3.
S. Tsukhlo, ``Formirovanie obemov i struktury vypuska rossiiskikh promyshlennykh predpriiatii,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #6 (1995): 36.
Elektrosila #40, 12/8/92, 2; interview, assistant director for production, lathemaking ¢rm, March 1995, St. Petersburg.
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86. Svetlana #21, 6/19/91, 5; #19, 6/3/92, 2; #2, 1/22/92, 2; Elektrosila #10, 3/10/
92, 3.
87. Interview (furniture manufacturer), Tula, November 1995.
88. Is this so di¡erent from behavior among Western ¢rms? The answer is both yes
and no. On the one hand, certainly one ¢nds in the West entrepreneurs who do not
understand market search and who think solely in terms of production. In fact,
Fligstein has argued that this was a problem for large industrial ¢rms until the
Great Depression, when the ``manufacturing conception of control'' was widespread and managers thought in terms of product and not in terms of product
markets. However, the importance of such a ``cultural incongruity'' is less important in capitalist nations, where several factors mitigate this: the existence of a
large number of experts, consultants, and courses for the entrepreneur; and
the existence of rules that demand certain behavior with penalty for lack of
conformity (e.g., bankruptcy, inability to receive a loan without a business plan,
etc.). Further, in capitalist countries certain overall principles exist and are, to a
degree, shared in theory; capitalism has been achieved in these countries
(although, as Fligstein points out, economic conceptions are always changing); in
Russia, on the other hand, the transition is in part the creation of such baseline
understandings.
89. T. Dolgopiatova and I. Evseeva, ``Ekonomicheskoe povedenie promyshlennykh
predpriiatii v perekhodnoi ekonomike,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #8 (1994): 42.
90. Dolgopiatova and Evseeva, ``Ekonomicheskoe povedenie promyshlennykh predpriiatii,'' 42.
91. Elektrosila #40, 12/8/92, 2.
92. Interview (expert and economist), St. Petersburg, December 1995.
93. See John Meyer and Brian Rowan, ``Institutionalized Organizations: Formal
Structure as Myth and Ceremony,'' in Walter Powell and Paul DiMaggio, editors,
The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, 41^62.
94. Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
95. Niklas Pettersson and Stefan Nordstro«m, Western Perspectives on the Russian
Shipbuilding Company Almaz (Linko«ping: Linko«ping Institute of Technology,
1994), 67, 104.
96. Leningradskii stankostroitel', 7/13/93, 1.
97. IESC is an American organization that brings retired American managers to
Russia to give talks and free consultations on restructuring, market study, and
overall market behavior and decision-making. The success of IESC's mission is
di¤cult to assess.
98. ``Concerning intersectoral diversi¢cation of manufacturing, world experience testi¢es thus: it [the FPG] is the best way to guarantee ¢nancial stability of producers
and to guarantee the £ow of capital from stagnating sectors to promising sectors.''
Sergei Batchikov and Iurii Petrov, ``Formirovanie ¢nansovo-promyshlennykh
grupp i gosudarstvo,'' Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal #2 (1995), 4.
99. Irina Starodubrovskaia, ``Financial-industrial Groups: Illusions and Reality,''
Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 7/1 (1995): 5^19; Larisa
Gorbatova, ``Formation of Connections between Finance and Industry in Russia:
Basic Stages and Forms,'' Communist Economies and Economic Transformation
7/1 (1995): 21^34; Jane E. Prokop, ``Industrial Conglomerates, Risk Spreading
and the Transition in Russia,' Communist Economies and Economic Transformation 7/1 (1995): 35^50; Lev Frankel, ``Financial-industrial Groups in Russia:
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Emergence of Large Diversi¢ed Private Companies,'' Communist Economies and
Economic Transformation 7/1 (1995): 51^66; S. Batchikov and Iu. Petrov, ``Formirovanie ¢nansovo-promyshlennykh grupp i gosudarstvo,'' Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal #2 (1995): 3^10; E. Batizi, Upolnomochennye banki i ¢nansovopromyshlennaia integratsiia,'' Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal #10 (1994):
42^46; Kh. Mingazov, ``Stanovlenie novykh organizatsionno-khoziaistvennykh
struktur v rossiiskoi industrii,'' Rossiiskii ekonomicheskii zhurnal #9 (1993):
25^34, and #10 (1993): 50^60; Kommersant #35, 9/26/95; #47, 12/19/95.
See Yevgeny Kuznetsov, ``Learning to Learn: Emerging Patterns of Enterprise
Behavior in the Russian Defense Sector, 1992^1995,'' in Bartlomiej Kaminskii,
editors, Eonomic Transition in Russia and the New States of Eurasia (Armonk,
N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1996); E. Belianova, ``Motivatsiia i povedenie rossiiskikh
predpriiatii,'' Voprosy ekonomiki #6 (1995): 20^21; I. Alimova, V. Buev, V. Golikova, and T. Dolgopiatova, ``Problemy malogo biznesa glazami predprinimatelei,''
Voprosy ekonomiki #11 (1994), 119^120. My thanks also to Olga Patokina for
sharing her research and insights; interview with the author, September 1997,
University of Pittsburgh.
Simon Clarke, ``The Enterprise in the Era of Transition,'' in Simon Clarke, editor,
The Russian Enterprise in Transition (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1996);
Michael Burawoy and Pavel Krotov, ``The Soviet Transition from Socialism to
Capitalism.''
Leningradskii stankostroitel' #14, 4/16/91, 3.
Leningradskii stankostroitel' #36, 9/26/90, 3.
Leningradskii stankostroitel' #23, 11/4/94, 1.
Kirovets #9, 1/29/93, 1. This boss also complained that shop£oor bosses should
not be responsible for searching for buyers: ``I consider that the transfer of the
search for orders to the shoulders of shop£oor bosses is bringing at the present
time certain negative results, but it would be signi¢cantly more advantageous for
the enterprise if this work were taken up on a professional basis by corresponding
factory [i.e., central] services.''
Kirovets #18, 2/19/93, 2.
Leningradskii stankostroitel' #9, 3/5/92, 2.
Positron was not alone in playing host to con£ict between employers and employees. See Simon Clarke, editor, Con£ict and Change in the Russian Industrial
Enterprise (Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1996).
In my interviews with managers, legal hindrances were cited as reasons for avoiding downsizing or shutting down subdivisions only once; the vast majority of
responses involved perceived duties towards ``their'' workers, the inability simply
to throw them out onto the street.
Certainly, paternalism also brought power to managers as well. See Simon Clarke,
``The Enterprise in the Era of Transition.''
Interview (enterprise subdivision, assistant director for production), St. Petersburg (Russia), March 1995.
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, Predpriiatii na puti reform (polozhitel'nyi opyt raboty). Materialy soveschaniia rukovoditelei promyshlennykh predpriiatii. (Moscow: Ministry of Finance, 1993), p. 19.
Svetlana #34, 10/28/92, 6.
Interviews by the author with various assistant directors (anonymous), St. Petersburg (Russia), July 1997.
The crucial issue should be how path dependency works ^ and this depends on
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perception of what needs to change and the available tools for changing. For
example, the Central Bank was a legacy of history; but it need not have been the
autonomous center of the Russian ¢nancial world. One can imagine that, had
reformers been tied to an East Asian rather than a Western economic model, the
Ministry of Finance and State Property Committee would have organized Russian
industry into ¢nancial-industrial groups in£uenced by the state (and in fact this
was proposed); the banking sphere would have been the handmaiden of the stateindustry alliance. Russia could have come to resemble South Korea ^ also a
potentially path dependent result (given centralization in the Soviet system).
Fligstein, Transformation of Corporate Control.
This need not mean that the Defensive FPGs will disappear as the older generation
dies o¡. If Defensive FPGs remain stable, they will reproduce the manufacturing
conception of control. We should expect the following in the future: 1) Defensive
FPGs that have emerged may remain, but their organizing principle will be less
relevant over time as a new generation comes to power. In the future the Defensive
FPG will not spread beyond existing Defensive FPGs. 2) Existing Defensive FPGs
will be in tension with Financial FPGs over legitimacy of organizing principles.
The role of state policy and resource ownership will be crucial in determining
whether the Defensive FPG remains a viable form. (I suspect that Defensive
FPGs, after the passing of the older generation, will follow the strategies of
Financial FPGs, assuming that the latter remain the dominant conception of
control. Fligstein suggests that the ¢nancial conception of control may be replaced
by the emerging ``shareholder value conception of control.'' See Fligstein, ``Markets as Politics,'' 670.)
This is close to William Roy's and Neil Fligstein's interpretations o the rise of the
corporate form and modern American capitalism. See William Roy, Socializing
Capital (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), and Neil Fligstein, The
Transformation of Corporate Control.
I address creating the invisible hand of authority elsewhere; paper available from
the author on request.
New York Times, 8/26/98, 1 and 6, and 8/27/98, 1 and 10.

